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On November 14, 1989, United States Representative Jason Abrams
delivered the United States response to Agenda Item 152 to the General
Assembly: "Nevertheless, my delegation must confess that its enthusiasm
for the proposal to create an international criminal court is tempered by
several serious questions regarding the feasibility and usefulness of such a
court. In this connection. ... we wish to remind the Committee that the
creation of an international criminal court is an idea with a long, and largely
disappointing history."'
An examination, however cursory, of the efforts to create an international
criminal tribunal reveals a struggle similar to that of Homer's "Sisyphus '" 2
and his effort to roll a rock up to the top of a mountain. According to Greek
mythology, Sisyphus, the King of Corinth, was condemned by the gods to
eternally roll a heavy rock up a steep mountain, "whence the stone would
fall back of its own weight,"3 making Sisyphus's ordeal both futile and
unending. For his part, Sisyphus does not cease from his endeavor and
continues to go back to the bottom to start anew.
For the better part of this century there have been efforts to establish an
international crimes court. Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in 1945
and 1946, there have been several proposals for both an international crimes
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' Id. at 119.
289
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
tribunal and an international crimes code.4 Although these efforts have for
the most part, been soundly critiqued or simply ignored by the community
of nations, like Sisyphus, international legal scholars and others continually
renew efforts for their acceptance. 5 This continued effort is evidenced by
current attempts to foster consensus for the creation of an international
crimes court.
According to Homer, the impetus for Sisyphus's predicament is subject to
various and widely differing explanations. Similarly, the failure to establish
an international criminal court has been attributed to different concerns on
the part of some members of the international community. While some
concerns are extremely valid and need to be addressed, others are more
disingenuous and somewhat transparent. For example, in 1989, the
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago6 proposed
the establishment of an international crimes court with jurisdiction to try
individuals. Arguing that an international criminal tribunal would provide
an alternative to the present system of aut dedere autjudicare (extradite or
prosecute), the proposal called for an international criminal tribunal with its
own code. The code would limit the jurisdiction of the court to crimes such
as international trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs. This limitation, however,
would allow for the further expansion and elaboration of a greater variety of
international crimes in the future.
This proposal provided that an international criminal court would have
jurisdiction only if such is conferred explicitly by both the state of which the
accused is a national, as well as the state or states in which the crime is
alleged to have been committed. Further, the proposal contained the proviso
that consent to jurisdiction could not be presumed.7
In response, United States Alternate Representative Jason Abrams, while
pointing to the disappointing history of proposals to create an international
4 M. CHmm BAsslouN, A DRAnt INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFt STATUTE
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIDUNAL (1987).
'Id. at 11.
6 International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in the Illicit
Trafficking in Drugs Across National Frontiers, and Other Transnational Criminal Activities:
Establishment of an International Criminal Court with Jurisdiction over such Crimes, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Hem 152, at 8-11, U.N. Doc. A/c.6/44/SR.38 (1989)
(statement of Marjorie R. Thorpe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Trinidad and





criminal jurisdiction, put forward the question of "whether there is something
inherent in the very concept of an international criminal court, and the
derogation from state sovereignty which it represents, that would prevent
such a court from receiving the broad acceptance which would be required
to make it effective."'
Proclaiming the creation of an international criminal tribunal a "complex
endeavor," Abrams called for careful deliberation and thoughtful study. He
proposed a series of issues that should be addressed before the world is
ready for an international criminal court, such as: How will evidence be
obtained, who will investigate and prosecute the case, what rules of
procedure would apply, and who would incarcerate the offenders?9
Furthermore, he questioned whether states would be more willing to
relinquish an accused to an international criminal court than to prosecute the
alleged offender themselves, or extradite him or her to another state."0
Issues such as rules of procedure, collection of evidence, investigation and
prosecution of cases, and power of incarceration are important and require
an intelligent response. Those issues, however, are not as critical to the
establishment of an international criminal court as is the question of whether
states that are disinclined to participate in the current international process
of prosecuting or extraditing would be more willing to participate in an
international crimes tribunal.
According to the Greeks, Sisyphus's disdain for the gods, his irreverence
for death, and his joy for life earned him the penalty wherein his entire
existence is dedicated toward the accomplishment of nothing. Such is the
price he paid for devouring life's passions." Unlike Sisyphus, mankind
cannot afford to suffer the same fate. While myths are made for the
imagination, the problems facing the international community with the
continued growth of transnational and international crimes are very real.
Terrorism, genocide, torture, crimes against diplomats, and trafficking in
illicit narcotic drugs all constitute a continued threat to international peace
and security and must be addressed.
This article will examine initiatives that have been undertaken since the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to establish an international crimes tribunal
including the most recent proposals by the United Nation's International Law
Statement of Jason Abrams, supra note 1, at 2.
SId.
Id. at 2.
" CAMUS, supra note 2 at 120.
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Commission and the American Bar Association. It will also examine how
these proposals address issues such as the scope of jurisdiction and
composition of the court. Further, it will discuss the arguments for and
against the establishment of an international crimes court. Finally, it will
propose how these issues should be solved in light of the historical problems
associated with the establishment of other international tribunals and their
eventual solution.
I. INmATvFs To ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COURT
12
In the last fifty years there have been several initiatives towards the
establishment of an international crimes tribunal. In 1951, the International
Law Commission submitted a draft statute for an international crimes court,
which was revised in 1953."3 In 1982, the International Law Association,
while meeting in Montreal, adopted a draft statute for an international crimes
tribunal. 4  Furthermore, the Instituto Superiore Intemazionale di Scienze
Criminali (International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences) also
adopted a draft statute for an international criminal tribunal."5 More
recently, the International Law Commission of the United Nations and the
American Bar Association have also made proposals for the establishment
of an international crimes court. Although there have been other proposals
and attempts to instigate the establishment of an international crimes-
court,1 6 these constitute the more substantive approaches. Hence, an
1 Some of the issues addressed in sub-sections A, B, and C of this section have been
raised in a report to Congress prepared under the supervision of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Criminal Law and Probation Administration. The report, which was
transmitted to Congress in October of 1991, was approved by the Judicial Conference of the
United States. See Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Feasibility
of and the Relationship to the Federal Judiciary of an International Criminal Court
(September, 1991) (handout) [hereinafter Judicial Conference Report].
13 Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR 9th Sess., Supp.
No. 12, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954) [hereinafter 1953 U.N. Draft Statute].
14 International Law Association, Report of the 60th Conference, Montreal, Aug. 29 -
Sept. 4, 1982, at 378-79, 454-62 (1983).
" See M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on International and
Transnational Criminality, Including the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
15 NOVA L. REv. 354 (1991).
16 In 1990, the American Bar Association International Law Section recommended the
establishing of an International Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction. The Court's
jurisdiction would be limited to offenses enumerated in the 1988 United Nations Convention.
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individual review of the respective initiatives and proposed draft statutes will
illustrate the different issues involved in the creation of an international
crimes tribunal.
A. 1953 United Nations Draft Statute
In 1949, the United Nations, by way of the International Law Commission
and the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, began work on
both an international crimes code and on a statute creating an international
crimes court.
The draft statute was finalized after much haggling in 195 1,17 and later
revised in 1953." However, it failed to get much support from the
international community. The draft code, also finalized in 1951, was largely
criticized because of its failure to define what it meant by the term
"aggression."' 9
The Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, in drafting the
statute, envisioned three different methods by which an international criminal
court could be established: 1) by an amendment to the United Nations
Charter; 2) by establishment of a multilateral convention; and 3) by
resolution of the General Assembly. 0 Further, the Committee looked to the
possibility of creating the court by way of resolution by the General
Assembly, followed by multilateral conventions that would confer jurisdic-
tion on the court.2' Apparently a majority of the Committee members
preferred the creation of an international crimes court by multilateral
convention, stating that they thought it was "the best and most feasible
See Report of the Council of the Section of Int'l Law and Practice, ABA, August 3, 1990, in
6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. RFrm. 284 (1990). Further, in 1990, Congress passed a resolution
which called for the United States to explore the need for an international criminal court. The
resolution which was part of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act, also called on the
Judicial Conference to report to Congress on the feasibility of, and relationship to, the federal
judiciary of an international criminal court. See Foreign Operations, Expert Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, P.L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 2066 (1990); Judicial
Conference Report, supra note 12.
17 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 7 U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No.
11, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).
11 1953 U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 13.
'9 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 40-43 (1980).
20 1953 U.N. Draft Statue, supra note 13, ch. 2, at 5.
21 Id.
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method for some time to come."2
Under article 2 of the proposed draft statute, the court would apply
international law, and where appropriate, national law. This could only be
done if the court had a draft code which would provide substantive law for
the jurisdiction of the court. In the revisions, the number of judges was
increased from nine to fifteen.2
The court's jurisdiction is not presumed, but must be specifically
conferred, and conferring jurisdiction on the court would not imply that a
state would divest its national courts of the power to deal with a crime or
case.' An individual could not be tried by the international criminal court
unless both the state of which he was a national and the state in which the
offense was committed conferred jurisdiction upon the court.'
The statute also provided for a five-judge panel that would make a
pre-trial determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction.' Under article 34, the prosecutor would be appointed by the
complaining state. Apparently, the United States, concerned with its
constitutional framework, convinced the Committee to allow trial by jury in
cases where the instrument conferring jurisdiction called for it.27
In an effort to deal with the possible politicization of the court, article 29
provided that proceedings may be instituted by any state that had conferred
jurisdiction to the court over offenses involved in the case. It allowed,
however, for the United Nations to halt any proceedings in a particular case
in the interest of maintaining peace.' Under articles 35 and 36, the court
must give notification of the indictment to the offender, the state of which
the accused was a national, the state in which the crime was alleged to have
been committed, and where possible, to the victim's state.'
Article 38 provides that the accused is to be presumed innocent, as well
as have the right to be present at all stages of the proceedings, to conduct his
own defense, and be defended by counsel. Further, article 38 provides that
the proceedings be translated into the language of the accused. It also allows
the accused to conduct discovery of evidence, and it extends the right to the
" Id. at 6.
23 Id. art. 5.
24 Id. art. 26.
2 Id. ar. 27.
M6 I. art. 33.
I. art. 37, See also FERENCZ, supra note 19, at 43.
2 1953 U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 13, art. 29.
29 1d. arts. 35, 36.
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defendant not to testify, as well as to have no negative inferences drawn
from the failure to take the stand. 3"
Once the court has jurisdiction, article 40 empowers the court to issue
arrest warrants. It must be noted, however, that there is no provision for the
service or execution of the warrant.3 Further, although article 42 gives the
court the power to compel attendance and produce evidence, there is no
mechanism provided that allows compulsion of third party witnesses, or for
the production of evidence by third parties.32
Article 50 provides double jeopardy protection by prohibiting the trial of
an individual by a national court of the state conferring jurisdiction for the
same offense for which that person was tried in the international tribunal.
This provision appears to allow for prosecution of an individual by a state
that has not conferred jurisdiction to the court over the same offense, and it
seems to allow for the prosecution by the international court of a person who
has already been tried in a national court for the same offense.33
Finally, there are some points on which the Committee either did not reach
agreement or intentionally left open for further discussion. Among these
points were the issues of the contents of a convention creating the interna-
tional crimes court, and what limitations, if any, would be put on states'
rights to make reservations to the jurisdiction of the court.3
Furthermore, there was very little unanimous support for any of the
articles of the draft statute. In fact, the final version that was to be
submitted to the General Assembly gave the impression that there was
nothing final about any of the articles of the statute.35 Moreover, with the
work on the draft code still in progress under the International Law
Commission, the draft statute was tabled to await the completion of the draft
code. The final version of the draft code caused much disagreement
because, as stated above, it failed to define what it meant by the term
"'aggression."
30 Id. art. 38.311Id. art 40.
32 Id. art. 42.
33 Id. art. 50.
34 Id., chap. 8, at 22.
35 FERENCZ, supra note 19, at 44-45.
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In 1954, a Committee on Defining Aggression 36 was established by the
Sixth Committee with a mandate to report back to the General Assembly in
1956.a7 In turn, the effort to create an international crimes tribunal stalled,
and with the beginning of the cold war it effectively came to a standstill.
B. International Law Association Draft Statute
During its 60th Conference held in Montreal in 1982, the International
Law Association (ILA) adopted a draft statute of an international criminal
court. Although originally drafted in Montreal in 1982, the statute was
amended at the 61st Conference held in Paris in 1984.8 For purposes of
this analysis the amended version will be used.
The statute called for an international crimes court with jurisdiction over
"natural persons," which would apply "general principles of law recognized
by nations. 3 9 The statute in article 23, calls for concurrent jurisdiction
under which a person may be tried by the national court or, if referred by the
state, to the international crimes court.' It also provides that a state may
confer jurisdiction on the Court by "convention, special agreement or
unilateral declaration."4'
Under article 1, the statute contained the proviso that, in order for
jurisdiction over the person to attach, the person must be charged with any
of the offenses itemized in a number of United Nations conventions.42 For
example, the statute provides the court with jurisdiction over offenses in,
among other conventions, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide,43 the Convention for the Suppression of unlawful
' On December 14, 1974, The United Nations General Assembly, acting on Committee
recommendations, formulated Resolution 3314 which defined "aggression" as "armed force
by one state against another," and adopted eight different articles defining the aggression.
Farhad Malekian, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, THE LEGAL AND CRrICAL ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 71-80 (1991).
'7 Id. at 45.
38 International Law Association, Report of the 61st Conference, Statute for an
International Criminal Court, Paris, Aug. 26 - Sept. 1, 1984 (1985) [hereinafter ILA Draft
Statute].
39 Id. arts. 19, 22.
40 Id. art. 23.
41 Id. art. 19(2).
421 Id. art. 1.
' Convention on Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
arts. II, 11, and IV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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Seizure of Aircraft (hijacking),' the Convention on the High Seas (pira-
cy),45 the Slavery Convention,' the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs47 and the Convention of Psychotropic Substances (narcotics traffick-
ing)," the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting
in Currency,49 the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil,'o the Convention against the Taking of Hostages,5 the
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apart-
heid,52 and the four Red Cross Conventions of 1949, which prohibit the
mistreatment of civilians and military personnel during wartime.53
There are some notable differences between this statute and the 1953 U.N.
Draft Statute above. For example, under article 21 of the ILA Draft Statute,
only one of the interested states must confer jurisdiction.' In contrast, the
1953 U.N. draft statute calls for jurisdiction to be conferred by both the state
in which the accused is a national and the state in which the crime is alleged
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 1,
10 I.L.M. 133.
4 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Apr. 29, 1958, arts.
15-17, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169.
' Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2601, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Protocol
Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, art. 1, 7 U.S.T. 479, 182 U.N.T.S. 51, 212
U.N.T.S. 17; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, arts, 1,6, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
' Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, art. 36 para. 1, 2(a)(i)(ii), 18 U.S.T.
1408, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, 252.
Convention of Psychotropic Substances, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 58/6 (1971).
9International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, Apr. 20, 1929,
arts. 3-4, 112 L.N.T.S. 371.
10 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12,
1954, arts. 3-5, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, 600 U.N.T.S. 332 (amendments to Convention).
" Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/34/819 (1979).
52 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (signed Nov. 30, 1973; in force July 18, 1976).
11 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
SILA Draft Statute, supra note 38, art. 21.
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to have been committed." Furthermore, under the ILA Draft Statute either
the state in which the accused has citizenship or the state in which the
accused is present may confer jurisdiction on the court to try the individu-
al.56
An important difference between the ILA Draft Statute and the 1953 U.N.
Draft Statute is the ILA Draft Statute's double jeopardy provision contained
in article 45, whereby no individual tried in a national court may be tried
again by the international tribunal, and, likewise, no person tried by the
international court can be tried in the national court of any contracting
state.57  Under the 1953 U.N. Draft Statute above, an individual may
theoretically be tried by the international tribunal even though he or she was
tried by a national court for the same offense.58 Moreover, under the 1953
U.N. Draft Statute, an individual could conceivably be tried by a national
court of a state that has not conferred jurisdiction to the international
court."
Another difference between the ILA Draft Statute and the 1953 U.N. Draft
Statute is that although article 35 of the ILA Draft Statute provides
procedural rights like a fair trial, the right to be present at all proceedings,
the right to have the proceedings translated to the defendant's language, the
right to remain silent and not testify, and the right to submit evidence and
cross-examine witnesses, there is no provision for the right to subpoena
witnesses or compel testimony.'
Article 40 of the ILA Draft Statute provides that, in order for an individual
to be convicted, a two-thirds majority of the judges participating in the trial
is needed. 6' Additionally, although the court may alter its judgment upon
discovery of decisive facts which were previously unknown, as in the 1953
U.N. Draft Statute, the judgment of the court is final and cannot be
appealed. 62
Further, under article 31, once jurisdiction has been obtained by the court,
a Commission of Criminal Inquiry may indict, dismiss, or recommend a
settlement of the case. However, no standard of proof is provided for the
55 1953 U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 13.
ILA Draft Statute, supra note 38, at art. 21.
7Id. art 45.
1953 U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 13.
5 Id.
60 Id.
" ILA Draft Statute, supra note 38, art. 40.
62 Id. arts. 44, 46; 1953 U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 13.
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Commission to judge the sufficiency of the evidence.' Under article 37,
when jurisdiction has been conferred, the court may issue arrest warrants
only upon "strong suspicion and belief on reasonable and probable grounds"
that an individual has committed a crime."
Finally, like the 1953 U.N. Draft Statute, article 33 of the ILA Draft
Statute provides that, upon indictment, the accused (as well as the state from
which the individual is a national or the state in which he or she is a habitual
resident) and the state in which the crime is alleged to have been committed
must be notified of the indictment.65
Although the ILA Draft Statute fails to provide a mechanism, article 1
leaves open the possibility that other offenses which might be included in
other conventions may fall under the jurisdiction of the court, provided that
"such offenses have been defined with sufficient precision. ''"
C. Instituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali 1990 Draft
Statute
In 1990, a Committee of experts in international criminal policy met in
Siracusa, Italy. The meeting was held at the Intituto Superiore Internzionale
di Scienze Criminali (ISISC) under the auspices of the Italian government for
the purpose of drafting a statute for an international criminal tribunal.'
The final result was a draft statute which was greatly influenced by Professor
M. Cherif Bassiouni,' and based on other models, primarily on the Draft
Statute for the Creation of an International Criminal Jurisdiction to
Implement the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid (Siracusa Draft Statute).6
The Siracusa Draft Statute was published under the byline A Comprehen-
sive Strategic Approach on International Cooperation for the Prevention,
Control, and Suppression of International and Transnational Criminality,
Including The Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Compre-
63 ILA Draft Statute, supra note 38, art. 31.
6 Id. art. 37.
' Id. art. 33; 1953 U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 13, art. 36.
(Id. at 280.
67 Bakesley, Committee on Experts Considers International Criminal Court Proposal, 6
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 1 (1990).
" Professor of Law, Depaul University.
69 Blakesley, supra note 67, at 2, citing U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1426 (19 Jan. 1981).
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hensive Approach)."0
The Siracusa Draft Statute calls for an international criminal tribunal
(whose jurisdiction includes both natural persons and legal entities) with
universal jurisdiction over offenses enumerated in an annex to the Conven-
tion creating the Court." Unlike the ILA Draft Statute above, however,
which provided that the international crimes tribunal would have jurisdiction
over offenses enumerated in several international Conventions, this statute
does not specify the type of crimes over which the court would have
jurisdiction. Instead, it leaves the question for another day when a Draft
annex to the Convention creating the court is provided.
Further, the statute provides that the Court may obtain jurisdiction over
crimes and cases not enumerated in the annex, by way of "transfer of
criminal proceedings" from the state that has jurisdiction over the case. In
those cases, the international court would apply the substantive law of the
transferring state, but would apply its own procedural rules. 2
Additionally, unlike the ILA Draft Statute and the 1953 U.N. Draft Statute
that provide for proceedings to be initiated by a state, this statute allows for
proceedings to be initiated by anyone delivering a complaint to the
"prosecuracy," who serves as the prosecutorial and investigative arm of the
court. The complaint may also be initiated by the prosecuracy itself.
7 a
Contemplating that the international crimes tribunal's orders would be
enforced by contracting states, the statute provides for the court to issue
warrants, injunctions, search warrants, subpoenas, and what the commentary
calls a "non-exhaustive list of orders. 7 4  These orders would then be
executed pursuant to the laws of the particular state in which the order is to
take effect.
Under this draft statute, a case will not go forward unless it has been
determined in a preliminary hearing that:
a. The case is reasonably founded in fact and law;
b. No prior proceedings before the Tribunal or elsewhere bar
the process in accordance with principle ne bis in idem or
fundamental notions of fairness; and
0 Bassiouni, supra note 15.
I' d. at 390.
I d. at 382.
71 Id. at 396.
'4 Id. at 399.
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c. No conditions exist that would render the adjudication
unreliable or unfair."
It must be noted that Subparagraph (c) apparently foresees the possibility
that non-cooperation by non-Parties to the convention could impair the
effectiveness of the tribunal. For example, if there were no cooperation from
a state through intentional failure to provide material evidence which
exculpates or incriminates an accused, a trial before the court would
conceivably become an unfair proceeding to any or all of the parties
involved, and in turn impair the reputation of the court.76
Although the standard of proof is not explicitly referred to in the Siracusa
Draft Statute, the decision of a chamber of three judges who hear the case
must be based on facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt.7
Unlike the 1953 Draft Statute and the ILA Draft Statute, which provide
no mechanism for appeal and whose decisions are final, the Siracusa Draft
Statute provides for an appeal process. Appeals from a guilty verdict or
imposed sanctions are to be made to the court en banc, but only if written
notice is given within 30 days of the entry of judgement or order,7" and
only if such appeals are based on questions of law.
Additionally, the court may revise the decision if evidence discovered after
the judgment or order has been entered would have had a material effect on
the determination, if the court was flagrantly misled, if the facts alleged are
not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or on other grounds which the court
may provide.79
Like the 1953 Draft Statute and the ILA Draft Statute, the Siracusa Draft
Statute provides the accused with procedural protections such as speedy trial,
the right to cross-examine, the right to remain silent, and the right of
presumption of innocence. However, this statute also provides an exclusion-
ary rule, which calls for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence "which
constitutes a serious violation of internationally protected human rights."'
Finally, the Siracusa Draft Statute contemplates and calls for the
cooperation and assistance of the international community-specifically, of
7 id.
7 Id. at 401.
7 Id. at 404.
7' Id. at 405.
7 Id.
9 Id. at 418.
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the contracting states. Their assistance is expected, not only in enforcing the
court's orders as stated above, but also in matters of extradition, letters
rogatory, procuring evidence, transfer of prisoners, and execution of
sentences.8'
D. 1990 International Law Commission Report on Feasibility and
Possibility of an International Criminal Court
In 1989, the General Assembly of the United Nations asked the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) to consider the feasibility of creating an
international crimes court, to be reported in its forty-second session held in
1990.82 This was somewhat of an unusual request, as only once in the
history of the ILC had it been asked to act so expeditiously. 3
After reviewing the historical efforts by the United Nations to establish an
international criminal tribunal, the ILC considered several issues that it saw
as essential to the establishment of such a court. It focused its examination
on the court's jurisdiction and competence, its structure, as well as the legal
force of the court's judgments and other issues pertaining to penalties,
implementation of judgments, financing, and possible international trial
mechanisms other than the court.8 '
Regarding the jurisdiction and competence 5 of an international crimes
SI Bassiouni, supra note 15.
See Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on The Need for An International Criminal
Court, 1 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 135 (1991); Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Develop-
ment: The Forty-Second Session of the International Law Commission, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
930 (1990).
93 In fact, the only other time that the ILC was asked to act so expediently was in 1972
when it was asked to draft a proposal providing for the protection of diplomats. The ILC
response in that occasion was the framework that led to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.
McCaffrey, supra note 64, at 931 (citing UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATION-
AL LAW COMMISSION 72 (4th ed. 1988)).
" Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Second Session,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 40-45, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990) [hereinafter 1990
ILC Report].
85 There is an apparently hair-splitting debate among criminal law experts as to whether
there is a distinction between jurisdiction and competence. Jurisdiction, the argument goes,
deals with the court's geographic, subject-matter and in personam authority. Competence on
the other hand, like in the theory of La Competence de la Competence which allows the
International Court of Justice to establish its own competence, establishes the particular
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tribunal, the ILC recognized three different issues: subject-matter jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over persons, and the nature of the court's own jurisdiction.
As to subject-matter jurisdiction, the ILC found that the court had three
alternatives: the tribunal could exercise jurisdiction over the crimes defined
in its own code; the court could exercise jurisdiction over only some of the
crimes defined in its code; or the court could be established independently
of a code, exercising only the jurisdiction that states would confer over all
crimes, particularly those under existing international conventions.86
As to the first alternative of exercising jurisdiction over crimes defined in
its own code, this option would have the disadvantage of having to wait for
a draft code to be completed to create the court. On the other hand, it would
have an advantage in that the crimes defined in such code would meet
criminal law standards, specifically the rule of nullum crimen sine lege or no
crime without a law.
Under the second alternative, if the court exercised jurisdiction over only
some of the crimes in its code, at its inception, it would create problems of
reciprocity and universitality. For example, certain states could conceivably
confer competence only to the court for particular crimes, while others could
continue to prosecute these same crimes through their national courts.
However, if the court was created independently of a code and would in
turn exercise jurisdiction solely over crimes enumerated in existing conven-
tions, much of the delay inherent in the drafting of a code would be
eliminated. 7
In regard to in personam jurisdiction, the ILC code currently being drafted
deals only with individuals. It does not cover legal entities like states and
organizations, unlike the ISISC draft statute above that contemplates court
jurisdiction over all legal entities. Although the issue of extending the
court's jurisdiction to states was discussed, it was left for future consider-
ation."
The third jurisdictional issue addressed by the 1990 ILC Report was the
nature of the court's jurisdiction. Here again, the Commission recognized
powers of the tribunal "with respect to its jurisdiction and provides the legal framework of
reference for the tribunal's exercise of its jurisdictional authority." Bassiouni, supra note 15
at 392 (citing I. Shihata, The Power of the International Court to Determine its own
Jurisdiction, THE HAGUE: NuHOFF (1965)).
86 1990 ILC Report, supra note 84, at 46-47.
" Id. at 47.
u Id.
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three alternatives: exclusive jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, and review
jurisdiction. 9
Under exclusive jurisdiction, individual states would abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over crimes falling within the competence of the
international tribunal. Under concurrent jurisdiction, both the international
and national courts would have competence to try a case, leaving to the state
the decision of whether to bring the case before its national court or before
the international tribunal.'
There are, however, some difficulties with concurrent jurisdiction. For
example, in regard to where a state elects to try a case, one state may choose
to proceed with a case in its national court, while another state may elect to
proceed with the same case before the international tribunal. Another
problem would be that of uniformity; specifically, that while some states
would bring their cases before the international court, others might choose
instead to use their own national courts for similar offenses. 9
Finally, with review jurisdiction, the court would only have competence
to review decisions of the national tribunals. In the case of granting the
court the power to issue legal opinions, it could take two forms: binding
opinions and advisory opinions.'
The last jurisdictional issue that the Commission considered was the
question of who could bring a case before the court. The Commission
recognized six different options: all states; all states parties to the court's
statute; any state which has an interest in the proceedings (because the crime
was committed within its territory, the victim was its national, the accused
was its national, or the accused was captured within its territory); intergov-
ernmental organizations of a universal or regional character; non-governmen-
tal organizations; or individuals.
Furthermore, the Commission discussed two possible restrictions on the
right to submit cases: 1) requiring the consent of all states which have an
interest in the case and 2) requiring authorization either from the General
Assembly or the Security Council.93 The Commission also considered the
" The Commission also discussed granting competence to the court as a complement to
any of the above options, allowing the court to issue legal opinions on issues of international




" Id. at 49.
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possibility that the international tribunal would act to harmonize international
criminal law, while the national courts would be left with the function of
deciding the merits of the case.'
In addressing the issue of the court's structure, the Commission questioned
whether the court would be a permanent or an ad hoc body. The Commis-
sion was concerned that an ad hoc body would raise issues of uniformity.
Furthermore, the Commission considered the issues of court composition,
election of judges, who would handle the prosecution, and pre-trial
procedures.95
The Commission also had some concern regarding the question of the
legal force of judgments; namely, the interplay between judgments of the
international criminal court and those of the national courts. For example,
if under concurrent jurisdiction the international tribunal rendered a judgment
before a national court in a particular case, the Commission felt that a
national court could not re-examine that case. On the other hand, if the
national court entered a decision before the international tribunal's judgment,
then, according to the Commission, the international criminal court could
re-examine the case provided: 1) another interested state had grounds to
believe that the decision was not based on proper law or facts; 2) the offense
was tried as an ordinary crime, although characterized as being under the
jurisdiction of the court; or 3) the case was appealed to the international
tribunal by a convicted individual.96
The Commission further addressed issues such as: penalties (where the
Commission recognized the need to satisfy the rule of nulla poena sine lege
or no punishment without law); implementation of judgments (under which
two options were considered: an international detention facility or implemen-
tation under the national systems); and financing of the court (for which two
options were considered: financing by the member states or financing by the
United Nations).'
Finally, the Commission considered the feasibility of establishing separate
courts for different crimes, concluding, however, that the best alternative was
a single institution. In addition, it considered the possibility of entrusting the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) with jurisdiction over criminal matters,
although it discarded the idea because an amendment to the ICJ's statute
9 Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
6 Id. at 51.
9 Id. at 51-52.
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would be needed. Yet another possibility considered by the Commission
was supplementing national courts with judges from other legal systems
when national courts were dealing with international crimes.9
The Commission concluded that, although different views existed as to the
structure and scope of jurisdiction of the court, there was broad consensus
for the creation of a permanent international criminal court."
E. American Bar Association Task Force Report on an International
Criminal Court
In February, 1991, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion, in consultation with the President of the ABA, as well as the Section
on International Law and Practice and the Section on Criminal Justice,
established a task force to examine the feasibility of creating an international
criminal court (Task Force). The Task Force, which was chaired by former
U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, issued its report in January
1992 after consulting with the International Affairs Office of the Legal
Advisor of the State Department, the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice, and with distinguished members of the legal profession.1 o
The Task Force recommended that the United States Government "work
toward finding solutions to the numerous important legal and practical issues
identified in the accompanying report, with a view toward the establishment
of an international criminal court. . . ."'0' It suggested that the court have
concurrent jurisdiction with member states. Under this arrangement, the
court's jurisdiction becomes dependent on the particular crimes that the
individual states decide to recognize within the court's jurisdiction."m2
The report further recommended that the international criminal court
should not try anyone without first having jurisdiction conferred by both the
state or states of which the accused is a national, and by the state or states
" Id. at 52.
9Id.
'oo American Bar Association Task Force on An International Criminal Court Preliminary
Report to the House of Delegates (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter A.B.A. Task Force Report]. The
revised report was published in August of 1992: American Bar Association Reports With
Recommendations To The House of Delegates Of The Task Force On An International
Criminal Court Of The American Bar Association And Of The New York State Bar





in which the crime is alleged to have been committed. In addition, the
report calls for the fundamental rights of the accused to be protected by the
court's constituent instruments, including its rules of evidence and criminal
procedure. 1
3
The Task Force also suggests that the international crimes court be
"complementary in nature" and that steps should be taken to continue
ongoing efforts with regard to mutual legal assistance. To accomplish this
goal, the Task Force calls for structures "to be created that supplement and
reinforce existing schemes" so that the establishment of an international
crimes tribunal would not erode the present system.'°4 Additionally,
judges selected for the court must be unbiased and of the highest profession-
al competence and integrity so as to avoid politicization of the court.'0s
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the Task Force identified four possibilities
under which the court could have jurisdiction over a case: exclusive;
concurrent; transfer of proceedings (under which a state having original
jurisdiction would transfer the case to the international court without losing
jurisdiction, whereby the court would apply the substantive law of the
transferring state, including its penalty provisions); or appellate review
jurisdiction."°
These jurisdictional provisions closely resemble those in the 1990 ILC
Report above, with the exception of the transfer jurisdiction issue.
Importantly, the concurrent jurisdiction recommended by the ABA task force
differs from that recommended by the 1990 ILC Report. Concurrent
jurisdiction under the ILC proposal would allow the individual state to
decide the particular cases to be turned over to the international tribunal for
trial. I°" Under the Task Force proposal, however, states decide what
specific crimes they would recognize to be within the court's jurisdic-
tion.108
As to exclusive jurisdiction, the report points out that if the United States
would agree to it, this provision would probably violate article III of the
103 id.
" Id. at 14.
'0' Id. at 15.
'OIld. at 16-17.
107 1990 ILC Report, supra note 87, at 53.
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 100, at 11.
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United States Constitution.'"9 The report also suggests that there would be
similar constitutional problems under a transfer jurisdiction proceeding. The
Task Force argues that, although under either exclusive or transfer jurisdic-
tion the court would be applying United States substantive law, the tribunal
would not have been established by Congress, with its judges appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. ° However, this
argument fails to take into consideration the possibility that the international
crimes tribunal might be created by way of a multilateral convention. If
established by multilateral convention-which would have to be ratified by
the Senate thereby becoming the supreme law of the land-the argument
becomes less viable. Moreover, many conventions and treaties allow for
reservations and understandings by the different states ratifying the
instrument. Consequently, if the international crimes tribunal was created
pursuant to such a multilateral convention, the United States would be in a
position to make reservations that would take into account its constitutional
framework.
The Task Force makes the same argument with regard to appellate review
jurisdiction. Specifically, that it would encounter similar constitutional
objections not only in the United States but in other states as well."'
The report makes the point that it finds it "highly unlikely" that the United
States would relinquish jurisdiction to an international tribunal in a case
where the crime is committed within the United States and the accused is in
custody in the United States, as it would raise "perhaps insurmountable
constitutional" objections, specifically the right to jury trial." 2 However,
it must be noted that in the 1953 U.N. Draft Statute above, the United States
prevailed in obtaining a provision that would allow for a jury trial in an
international criminal court, providing the instrument conferring jurisdiction
called for it.
Furthermore, the Task Force argues that if the accused were a U.S.
'09 Article IH, Section I of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their Offices during
good behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. U.S.
CoNsT. art. In, § I.
1o ABA Task Force Report, supra note 100, at 17-18.
. Id. at 18.
112 Id. at 21.
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national who is alleged to have committed a crime in another state, the
United States might prefer that the U.S. national be tried in an international
tribunal and not in the national courts of another state.
13
As to the scope of the jurisdiction of the international criminal court, the
report identifies four alternatives: the jurisdiction of the court would include
all crimes listed in an international criminal code;" 4 the court's jurisdiction
might be limited, at least at its inception to international drug trafficking;" 5
the court's jurisdiction might be expansive, which would include drug
trafficking plus several other crimes;"" and "accordion or Chinese menu"
jurisdiction, under which individual states choose from a list of crimes,
allowing the court to exercise jurisdiction in regard to that state."7
The Task Force also considered issues such as: the composition of the
court and the risk of politicization (as stated above, the report recommends
that judges be disinterested individuals who are of the highest professional
character and integrity, as well as experts in international criminal law);" 8
who could institute proceedings before the court; and what would be the
applicable law." 9 Furthermore, it argued that crimes should be defined in
the court statute as in the London Charter for the Nuremberg tribunals."z
Regarding proceedings at trial, the ABA Task Force Report argues that
because the jury system is a common law creature-as opposed to the
inquisitorial system employed in civil states-there should be a combination
of both (without any real explanation as to how this would be accom-
plished).''
In addressing the questions of imposition of sentence and incarceration, the
report suggests that the court should impose the sentence from a schedule of
penalties specified by the court's statute. 22 As to incarceration, the Task
Force suggests that the sentence be served in the state where the crime was
13 Id.
114 Id. at 23.
115 Id.
"
6 The report suggested court jurisdiction over genocide, torture, crimes against diplomats,
and international trafficking in illicit and narcotic drugs. Id. at 24, (citing statement of
Marjorie R. Thorpe, supra note 6, at 1).
117 Id. at 24-25.
1" Id. at 26.
119 Id. at 30.
12 Id. at 31.
121 Id. at 32-33.
122 Id. at 34.
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committed, arguing that it would neither be "feasible nor desirable to set up
a 'Devil's Island' type of permanent detention center...
fl. THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COURT
The case for an international crimes court has mostly been couched in
terms of facilitating the prosecution of crimes committed in violation of
"fundamental principles of human rights."'" The goal of the proponents
of an international crimes court is to bring to justice those who perpetrate
crimes against the human race. The struggle, very much like that of
Sisyphus, has not been easy. Up until now it has been seemingly futile and
unending.
The efforts for such an organ go as far back as 1895, when the Red Cross
suggested a tribunal to deal with continued violations of war."2 The
presence of a court has seldom deterred crime, or so the argument goes.
However, as Ricardo Alfaro, the former President of Panama stated in his
report to the International Law Commission regarding the feasibility of an
international crimes tribunal in 1950:
The cynic and the skeptic will surely remark that wars are
not stopped by means of international tribunals and penal
codes. In the municipal organization it may be observed
also that there are murderers and thieves despite the fact that
there are criminal courts and penal codes, but only God
knows how many murders and robberies are not committed
precisely because there are judges and penalties....
The administration of justice in the community of States will
not be complete until a criminal jurisdiction is established to
cope with international crimes. The necessity for such a
jurisdiction seems to be a fact established beyond reasonable
doubt... If the rule of law is to govern the community of
States and protect it against violations of the international
public order, it can only be satisfactorily established by the
promulgation of an international penal code and by the
'n Id. at 38.
'u Id. at 9.
12 FERENcZ, supra note 19, at 6.
[Vol. 23:289
CRIMES COURT
permanent functioning of an international criminal jurisdic-
tion. s
Alfaro was not without opposition even then. The United Kingdom
representative, in opposition to the creation of an international crimes court,
opined, "the only possible realistic view [is] that the time [is] not
ripe .... 9t" The Venezuelan representative concurred, feeling that interna-
tional cooperation had not progressed to the point where the creation of such
a court would be feasible."
Currently, many who question the effectiveness of an international crimes
court argue that the presence of an alternative court would not cause the
dissolution of the threat to criminals. Furthermore, they assert that a country
currently refusing to cooperate with the existing system of "extradite or
prosecute"-a system largely dependent on the existence of international
conventions addressing particular crimes-would be no more likely to
extradite to an international tribunal than to another country perceived to be
hostile toward its citizens or charges. Under the proposed system, even the
United States might be unwilling to extradite its nationals to a tribunal
perceived to be guided by shifting political winds.
The current system of prosecution or extradition-which calls for states
to not only enact national legislation criminalizing certain acts, but to also
prosecute or extradite offenders-does have its difficulties. For example,
some states refuse to extradite certain criminals for fear of political or
physical retaliation by groups within their borders. This has often been the
case When the United States has sought extradition of an offender and the
political climate in the offender's state resists U.S. efforts to punish its
nationals. With an international tribunal, the thinking goes, states would be
less likely to fear retaliation at home since they would be turning over their
nationals to neutral third parties who would investigate and prosecute the
charges.
The establishment of an international crimes court would not be difficult,
per se. However, the nations of the world must summon the political will
to do so. For example, in 1978, a year in which hijacking was prevalent,
several nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Canada, and others, decided that their respective governments would not
'2 Id. at 25.
'" Id. at 38.
128 id.
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allow airline flights to any state refusing to extradite hijackers seeking refuge
within its boundaries. Unfortunately, most of the nations determined to
implement these extradition rules were dependent upon petroleum exports
from the offending states, thereby making implementation of the plan
economically and politically difficult. 29
A. International Terrorism
1. Pan Am Flight 103 and U.T.A Flight 772
The need for an international crimes tribunal has recently been emphasized
by a number of international incidents of terrorism."0 A bomb destroyed
Pan American (Pan Am) Flight 103 in 1988 while over Lockerbie, Scot-
land,' killing 270 persons. A bomb was also detonated on France's
Union of Transport Aeriens (U.T.A.) Flight 772 a year later, killing 171
persons. 32 In both of these cases, evidence lead investigators to conclude
that Libyan nationals and officials were responsible for these acts.' 3
In connection with the latter bombing, France issued international arrest
warrants for four Libyan nationals (one of whom was a former foreign
minister), and sought two other Libyan suspects for questioning."" As to
the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, in November of 1991, a U.S. federal
grand jury handed down a 193-count indictment against Abdel Basset Ali
AI-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, both Libyan officials.
35
The United Kingdom, France and the United States asked Libya to
cooperate in bringing these suspects to justice by extraditing them to their
" Id. at 82.
'30 According to a report from the counterterrorism office of the State Department,
international terrorism incidents increased twenty-two percent in 1991. Although the report
attributed the increase to the Persian Gulf War, Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh, head of the
Counterterrorism Office, maintained that "the threat of terrorism, particularly state-sponsored
terrorism remains." The report although focussing on Iraq, Libya and Iran, also continued to
list Cuba, North Korea and Syria "as sponsors of terrorism." See Bill McAllister, 1991
Increase in Terrorism Reported, WASH. POST, May 1, 1992, at A24.
131 Paul Lewis, Libya Unyielding Despite U.N. Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at AS.
132 Turning Rivers Around, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1992, at 43-44; World Court Rejects
Libyan Bid to Avert Sanctions, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1992, at Al.
133 However, some commentators have suggested that the evidence points to Syria and
Iran as well. See Libya on the Block, WORLD PRESS REV., May, 1992, at 6.
13 Turning Rivers Around, supra note 132, at 44.
' U.S. Sees Libyan Ploy in Jet Bombing, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1992, at A31.
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respective states for trial. In its refusal, Libya stated that its main objection
was that the courts of these states would not be impartial, and hence would
not provide a fair trial for its nationals. Furthermore, Libya claimed that,
under current international law it did not necessarily have to extradite its
nationals, but could instead prosecute the accused in its own country. Libya
then asked that the United Kingdom, France and the United States provide
all evidence and pertinent information for the purpose of trying the suspects
in Libya.
Rejecting this request, the British Ambassador called for the two
individuals charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 to be tried either
in "Scotland or the United States."'" Libya finally proposed that it turn
over the suspects to an international court for trial. However, because none
existed, Libya suggested that the accused be tried in a neutral state-perhaps
Malta-this suggestion was also rejected. 13
Instead, the United Kingdom, France and the United States sought
assistance from the United Nation's Security Council. 3 ' The Security
Council, in response to the request, unanimously adopted Resolution 731,
which called for Libya to extradite the two indicted suspects to face trial.
The Resolution also called on Libya to cooperate with the French investiga-
tion of the bombing of U.T.A. flight 772.139
136 Id.
131 William Drozdiak, World Court Rejects Libyan Bid to Avert Sanctions, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 1992, at A34.
139 In another development, on April 28, 1992, Cuba asked the Security Council to
demand that the United States extradite two Cuban nationals accused of bombing a Cubana
Airlines jetliner over Barbados, in 1976. Cuba Takes Cue From U.S. in U.N. Demand,
WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1992, at A26. The request came despite the fact that the two suspects
have already been tried in Venezuela for the bombing which killed 73 persons. Id. Cuba's
demand, apparently prompted by the Libyan incident, and in an attempt to embarrass the U.S.
government, was triggered by what its Ambassador called a "judicial aberration." Id.
Apparently Cuba views the trial and the sentences imposed and served by the two Cuban
exiles (one of which has been described by former Attorney General as an "unreformed
terrorist"), as attempts by the American Government to cover up its involvement. For
additional discussions and detailed account of Cuba's demand, See id.
139 Lewis, supra note 131, at A8. The Resolution reads in part:
DEEPLY CONCERNED over results of investigations which implicate
officials of the Libyan government... [and with] requests addressed to
the Libyan authorities by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in connection with
the legal procedures related to the attacks carried out against Pan Am
Flight 103 and U.T.A. Flight 772.
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For its part, Libya has in effect ignored the Security Council Resolution,
instead offering to turn over A1-Megrahi and Fhimah to the Arab League,
who would in turn hand them over to the United Nations. Furthermore,
Libya went to the International Court of Justice seeking a declaration "that
the Pan Am 103 case is covered by the 1971 Montreal Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.""
Libya argued that under the Convention it has the right to try the suspects,
and has no obligation to extradite them to another state for prosecution.
Moreover, Libya argued that it did not have extradition treaties with either
the United States or the United Kingdom, and that failure to provide Libya
with the evidence to prosecute the accused was in effect a violation of
international law. 4" The United Kingdom, France and the United States
vigorously objected to this characterization and sought a resolution imposing
sanctions from the Security Council.
Although Libya would like to try its nationals accused in both the Pan Am
Flight 103 and the U.T.A. Flight 772 bombings, it cannot prosecute them.
Those involved are charged not only as individuals but as government
officials, in effect naming the Libyan government a party to the crimes
charged. Consequently, the trial would lack the required perception of
independence and impartiality. 42
The Security Council passed Resolution 748, which banned all flights to
and from Libya and prohibited the sale of arms to that country." 3 The
DETERMINED to eliminate international terrorism,
1. CONDEMNS the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 and U.T.A.
Flight 772 and the resultant loss of hundreds of lives.
2. STRONGLY DEPLORES the fact that the Libyan Government has
not yet responded effectively to the above requests to cooperate fully in
establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts referred to above against
Pan Am Flight 103 and U.T.A. Flight 772.
3. URGES the Libyan Government immediately to provide a full and
effective response to those requests so as to contribute to the elimination
of international terrorism;....
U.N. S.C. Res. 731, reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 732 (1992).
0 John M. Goshko, U.S. Sees Libyan Ploy in Jet Bombing, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1992,
at A31.
141 Id.
42 See id. (relating comments by Columbia University International Law Professor Oscar
Schachter).
143 U.N. S.C. Res. 748, reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 749 (1992); Over The Top, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 18, 1992, at 40-41.
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Security Council did not, however, impose a sanction against Libya's main
source of income, the sale of oil. It has been argued that the reason for this
failure was that, with the Iraqi sanctions in place-which prohibited the
commercial sale of oil by Iraq-a ban on Libyan oil could produce a world
crisis. 1" Furthermore, because some states such as Germany, Italy, Spain
and others are heavily dependent on Libyan oil, an embargo against it would
prove counterproductive. 14
Resolution 748 took effect on April 15, 1992, but not before Libya
returned to the International Court of Justice seeking an injunction prohibit-
ing the Security Council from enacting the proposed sanctions. The
International Court of Justice, however, ruled by a vote of 11 to 5 that in
effect, it lacked the competence to block compliance with Security Council
Resolutions. 1"6
To date, Libya has refused to cooperate with the Security Council
Resolutions, and its leadership has proclaimed that "Libya cannot be
humiliated and [that] its dignity and sovereignty cannot be violated. '147
Arguably with an international crimes court in place, Libya would have no
plausible reason for refusing to turn over the two suspects in the bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 for prosecution, nor would it have any excuse to
refuse to cooperate with the investigation of U.T.A. Flight 772.
Moreover, Libya's offer to turn the suspects over to the Arab League or
the United Nations is somewhat transparent, as both the Arab League and the
United Nations lack the necessary mechanisms or criminal jurisdiction to
effectively try these individuals. 48
2. The Rainbow Warrior
Another incident of terrorism that accentuates the need for an international
crimes tribunal occurred on July 12, 1985. While berthed in Auckland
Harbour, New Zealand, the British-registered Rainbow Warrior was sunk by
a squad of French military security service agents. A series of explosives
'" Lewis, supra note 131, at A8.
145 Paul Lewis Sanctions on Libya Take Hold as Deadline Passes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1992, at Al.
'46Id. at A6.
"4 Id. at Al (quoting Abdul-Salam Jalloud, Chief Lieutenant to Libyan President
Muammar el-Qaddafi).
1 Goshko, supra note 140, at A31 (discussing the comments of Columbia University
International Law Professor Oscar Schachter).
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destroyed the vessel owned by the environmental group Greenpeace,
resulting in the drowning of a crew member, Fernando Pereira. 149
Greenpeace had planned to use the Rainbow Warrior to lead a flotilla
against the French nuclear tests being conducted in Murora Atoll in the
South Pacific.'- A few days after the sinking, New Zealand authorities
arrested Major Alain Mafart and Captain Dominique Prieur, both French
military officers, and charged them with conspiracy to commit arson, the use
of explosives to intentionally sink the Rainbow Warrior, and the murder of
Fernando Pereira.' Although no extradition treaties existed with France,
New Zealand police also issued warrants and demanded the extradition of
other agents who were involved but had fled to France.'52
The arrested French agents originally plead not guilty, but subsequently
changed their pleas to guilty after the charges were reduced to manslaughter
and willfully causing damage to the Rainbow Warrior.1 53 In the meantime,
France admitted that the suspects involved were not only its agents but also
conceded, although somewhat reluctantly, that they were acting on its behalf.
Furthermore, France demanded New Zealand extradite the accused back to
France, arguing that the suspects were acting pursuant to official orders and
hence could not be charged with any crimes in New Zealand."M France
then imposed trade sanctions against New Zealand to underscore its resolve
to have its agents returned. France prohibited the import of lamb and lamb
brains from New Zealand, and threatened to bar the continued entry of New
Zealand butter into European Communities.'55
For its part, New Zealand was willing to extradite the French agents, with
the caveat, however, that they continue to serve their sentences.15 As to
the trade barriers, New Zealand registered its disapproval with France, and
formally filed a complaint with the European Community Trade Commis-
sioner. After much prodding by the Community, France admitted that it had
'9 See generally Michael Pugh, Legal Aspects of The Rainbow Warrior Affair, 36 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 655 (1987).
'50 Jodi Wexler, Note, The Rainbow Warrior Affair: State and Agent Responsibility for
Authorized Violations of International Law, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 389 (1987).
151 Pugh, supra note 149, at 656.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 656-57.
'54 Id. at 657.
155 Roger S. Clark, State Terrorism: Some Lessons From the Sinking of the "Rainbow
Warrior," 20 RUTGERS L.J. 393, 398 (1989).
' Pugh, supra note 149, at 657.
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imposed the sanctions but refused to rescind them. Efforts by other
European states to resolve the dispute failed." 7
Despite economic sanctions, the primary point of contention between the
parties was the agents' convictions and prison sentences. France argued that,
under its law, an individual can only be imprisoned as a result of a judgment
rendered by a French court, or as a result of provisions in an international
convention relating to the transfer of prisoners. France also contended that
under its law, any "homicide, wounding or striking" ordered by law or
lawfully sanctioned will not result in a criminal offense mandating a prison
sentence."' Therefore, its two agents incarcerated in New Zealand who
had been acting under official orders could not be tried or imprisoned for
their actions if returned to France.'3 9 The French Government offered to
extend to New Zealand an apology for its actions, admit its wrongdoing, and
proposed to financially compensate New Zealand for damages."W
New Zealand rejected France's demands and asserted that an action
contrary to its court decisions, sentencing, or law, would seriously undermine
the foundation of its judicial system. Furthermore, New Zealand argued that
the agents' sinking of the Rainbow Warrior was a serious violation of both
international and New Zealand law, and hence the crimes deserved the
sentences imposed.'
As to France's claim that its agents were acting under official orders, New
Zealand countered that under its criminal laws the defense of "superiors
orders" was not recognized, and hence not a ground upon which to release
157 Id.
'58 Wexler, supra note 131, at 399. But see B. JANKOVIC, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
154-55 n.101 (1984) (citing International Law Commission report stating that the perpetrator
is "responsible for that act and must be punished according to international law regardless of
whether the municipal law of his state regards such a deed as criminal or not. The mere fact
that internal law does not punish such a deed is no reason for the perpetrator to be freed of
criminal liability under international law.")
"9 id. at 399-400.
160 Clark, supra note 155, at 397-99. It must be noted that in the meantime, France
settled with the family of Fernando Pereira, agreeing to extend a formal apology to the
family, as well as pay them compensation in the amount of 2.3 million francs. Pugh, supra
note 149, at 657. Furthermore, France and Greenpeace had agreed to submit their dispute to
binding arbitration, which ultimately resulted in France having to pay Greenpeace $5 million
(U.S. dollars) in compensatory damages and $1.2 million in aggravated damages. Clark, supra
note 155, at 400-01.
'6' Clark, supra note 155, at 399; see also Wexler, supra note 158, at 399-400.
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the French agents. 62  New Zealand further demanded a formal and
unqualified apology from France as well as $9 million (U.S.) in compensa-
tion from the French government.'63
The two parties could not reach a settlement after a series of negotiations,
despite the urging of the European Communities and others. The lack of a
mechanism or international tribunal that could reconcile the differences in the
penal codes of France and New Zealand with international law made the
matter worse because of the diverse treatment of the agents' actions.
Ultimately, the issues were submitted to binding arbitration by (then) United
Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to decide the issues ex
aequo et bono, or in justice and fairness.
The Secretary-General ruled that: 1) France should convey to New
Zealand a formal and unqualified apology for the sinking of the Rainbow
Warrior in violation of international law; 2) France pay $7 million (U.S.) to
New Zealand as compensation; and 3) New Zealand release the two agents
to French Authorities on the condition that they be immediately transferred
to the island of Hao in French Polynesia and kept in the French military
facility there for a period of three years without the benefit of any contact
with the outside world. 164
All of the Secretary-General's rulings were carried out by the respective
parties. Looking back at the original dispute and the final resolution, one
concludes that the only true stumbling block to an earlier resolution of the
dilemma was differing views with regard to. the conviction and sentencing
imposed on the French nationals. An international crimes court would have
provided the parties a neutral mechanism to reconcile their differences. In
fact, there would have been no reason for both parties not to submit their
respective cases to an impartial tribunal which would have decided the case
to the benefit of the world community.
B. International Narcotics Trafficking
Finally, another crime begging for an International Crimes Court is
trafficking in illicit narcotics. Since 1980, almost 200 judges, eleven of
whom were Justices of the Supreme Court, have been assassinated by drug
I ld. at 400.




lords in Columbia."6 The principal reason for these killings is the fear of
the narcotrafficantes or drug traffickers fear of extradition to the United
States. In fact, they have gone as far as to adopt a slogan "Better a Tomb
in Columbia Than a Jail Cell in the U.S."'166
The international war on narcotics has largely been fought by way of
Multilateral Conventions that call for states to criminalize certain acts and to
either prosecute or extradite violators of those acts. The battle began as
early as 1909 with the meeting in Shanghai of thirteen states in an effort to
control the major narcotics problem of the time, opium. The result of their
efforts was the International Opium Convention at the Hague. 6
From 1912 to 1961, a series of international agreements was reached in
an effort to stay abreast of the battle against narcotics trafficking. For
example, in 1925, the Second International Opium Convention was
established in Geneva. 6  In 1931, the Convention for Limiting the
Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs was
enacted."W And in 1936, the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit
Traffic in Dangerous Drugs was agreed to in Geneva.1 70  Additionally, a
number of Protocols to the above Conventions were agreed to between 1936
and 1953.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was agreed to in New York in
1971, for the purpose of coordinating some of the provisions that were
included in the Conventions and Protocols dealing with international
narcotics trafficking.17' Unfortunately, international narcotics trafficking
continued to grow in geographical scope as well as in the number of
substances available. For example, synthetic drugs such as hallucinogens
and other medical stimulants and sedatives were being manufactured for the
sole purpose of street sale and use.
This development gave way in 1977 to the Psychotropic Substances
'65 George J. Church, Going Too Far, TIME, Sept. 4, 1989, at 12.
166 Id. at 13.
167 International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, T.S. No. 612, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
'6 International Convention, Second Opium Conference, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317.
169 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic
Drugs, July 13, 1931, T.S. No. 863, 139 L.N.T.S. 301.
170 Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs, June
26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299.
171 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S.
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Convention, in Vienna.'72 The Psychotropic Convention prohibits the
manufacturing for distribution, trade, and use of psychotropic drugs, except
for scientific and medical purposes. In 1972, the Single Convention on
Narcotics Drugs was bolstered by way of Protocol. 7 3 This Protocol not
only prohibits the manufacture, use and traffic in narcotics, but also provides
for states to initiate rehabilitation treatment for drug abusers. 74
Working under the various Conventions and Protocols, the international
community was able to gain some insight into the mechanism employed by
the various drug cartels. Concerned by the continuing escalation of the
international drug trade, the United Nations, by way of the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs, began searching for methods to bring the existing Conven-
tions up to date.'75 In 1985, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, one of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council, began
drafting a Convention that would supplement the other Conventions on
international narcotics trafficking. Finally, on December 19, 1988, after
much work with the different states and organizations, the United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances was adopted (Convention). 7 6
The Convention, whose instrument of ratification was deposited by the
United States with the United Nations on February 20, 1990, provides that
state signatories undertake certain obligations. Among other things, states
are compelled by the Convention to escalate their fight against international
drug trafficking, namely by enacting measures that would enhance their
capacity to not only make effective arrests, but also to prosecute both
domestic as well as international drug offenses.17  It also provides that
states continue providing legal assistance to other states by investigating,
seizing, and confiscating the products and proceeds of the international drug
"7 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S.
175.
'" Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 25, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3.
' 4 d. at 26 U.S.T. 1463, 976 U.N.T.S. 13.
'" Draft Convention against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and
Related Activities, G.A. Res. 39/141, U.M. GAOR, 39th Sess., 101st Plen. mtg. at 229, U.N.
Doc. A/39/141 (1984).
176 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec.




trade.' Furthermore, it calls upon states to criminalize certain activities
and to either prosecute or extradite the offenders. 79
The international community has made great efforts to establish multilater-
al Conventions in order to combat international drug trafficking. Despite
these efforts, however, the international drug trade continues to grow. As of
1986, the international sale of cocaine alone was a twenty billion dollar a
year business. '" One of the principal problems in fighting the wave of
international drug trafficking is the lack of an international tribunal that
could provide uniformity of laws and act as a forum to reconcile different
criminal codes.
C. The World Court
Aside from the proposals for an international criminal tribunal in part I of
this article, a recent proposal calls for the establishment of a "World
Criminal Court."'' Under this proposal, the jurisdiction of the Internation-
al Court of Justice would be extended to handle criminal matters.'82 This
proposal calls for the jurisdiction of the Court, at least at its inception, to be
limited so that only states could request that cases be heard before it.'8 3
However, there are problems with extending the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. Aside from the fact that expansion of the
Court's jurisdiction requires a resolution from the "General Assembly upon
recommendation of the Security Council,"' there are other problems. For
example, the proposal establishing the ICJ, which ultimately replaced the
Permanent Court of International Justice, was met with much opposition.
One of the more serious objections to the creation of the ICJ was the issue
of jurisdiction.
In 1945, as states negotiated the new court's jurisdiction, states were only
178 Id.
179 Id.
'go Welch, The Extraterritorial War on Cocaine: Perspectives From Bolivia and
Columbia, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL L. J. 39 (1988) (citing The National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee, The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States From
Foreign and Domestic Sources in 1985 and 1985, 26 (1987)).
181 A World Criminal Court?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 1992.
1 Id. at 14.
183 Id. at 14-15.
18 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 69, 59 Stat. 1055, 1064
(1945).
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willing to confer jurisdiction to the Court by two different methods:
(1) under Article 36(1), which allows the court to seize jurisdiction on "all
cases which the parties refer to it"; s5 and (2) by way of Article 36(2) or
the "Optional Clause." Under this clause:
[s]tates may at any time declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.'"
Therefore, the Court's jurisdiction is compulsory if voluntarily accepted.
Furthermore, under Article 36(3), jurisdiction may be conferred by a state for
"a certain time," often limited to a number of years." Thus, if the
jurisdiction of the Court is extended to include criminal matters, any state
may opt out of the Court's jurisdiction by merely withdrawing its consent to
the Court's jurisdiction as to criminal matters. This would severely weaken
the tribunal and create problems of uniformity.
In fact, in 1985, this is exactly the problem that New Zealand encountered
in its dispute with France in the case of the Rainbow Warrior. Originally,
New Zealand announced that it would seek legal recourse through the ICJ.
It then gave notice that it would ask for financial compensation for the
violation of its sovereignty by France, pursuant to international law and
United Nations Conventions.'
However, New Zealand was prevented from bringing any action before the
ICJ, because, among other things: (1) France's consent to the jurisdiction of
the ICJ had expired in 1973, and was never renewed; (2) France would not
accept the Court's jurisdiction in this case because France felt that, by
accepting the court's jurisdiction in 1966 pursuant to Article 36(2), it
385 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36(i).
386 Id. at art. 36(2).
187 Id. at art. 36(3).
18 Pugh, supra note 149, at 664.
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reserved the Court's jurisdiction as to "disputes arising out of a crisis
affecting national security or out of any measure or action relating thereto,
and disputes concerning activities connected with national defense;"'89
(3) New Zealand's acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in 1977
also contained a reservation that excluded:
disputes in respect of which any other party to the dispute
has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the
dispute: or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction on behalf of any other party to the dispute was
deposited or ratified less than twelve months prior to the
filing of the application bringing the dispute before the
Court;190
and (4) the same declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction by New Zealand
further included a statement of reciprocity honoring other states' acceptance
of the ICJ's jurisdiction."
III. CONCLUSION
Over the last two years, the international community has been the
beneficiary of an increasing climate of cooperation and goodwill among
States. Nowhere has this cooperation been more evident than within the
United Nations. In 1990, during the Iraq/Kuwait conflict, the Security
Council passed twelve resolutions in an effort to solve this conflict. All the
resolutions received overwhelming support from the Security Council, and
nine of the twelve were either passed unanimously or with just one or two
abstentions.9
189 Id. at 664.
"9 Id. at 665, citing 38 I.C.J.Y.B. 80 (1983-84).
'9' Id. at 665.
1 B.E. CARTER AND P.R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 770-
81 (1991) (noting S.C. Res. 660, adopted by 14-0 vote, with one abstention; S.C. Res. 661,
adopted by 13-0 vote, with two abstentions; S.C. Res. 662, adopted by 15-0 vote; S.C. Res.
664, adopted by 15-0 vote; S.C. Res. 665, adopted by 13-0 vote, with two abstentions; S.C.
Res. 666, adopted by 13-2 vote; S.C. Res. 667, adopted by 15-0 vote; S.C. Res. 669, adopted
by 15-0 vote; S.C. Res. 670, adopted by 14-1 vote; S.C. Res. 674, adopted by 13-0 vote, with
two abstentions; S.C. Res. 677, adopted by 15-0 vote; S.C. Res. 678, adopted by 12-2 vote,
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On February first of this year, a ceasefire ending a 15 year civil war took
effect in El Salvador. The ceasefire was largely the result of the work of the
United Nations and the tireless efforts of (then) Secretary-General Javier
Peres de Cuellar. 93 More recently, as seen above, the Security Council,
again acting unanimously, passed two Resolutions in response to the
bombings of Pan Am Flight 103, and U.T.A. Flight 772. 94 This spirit of
cooperation and goodwill makes the prospects for an international crimes
court far more viable than it was two years ago, before the break-up of the
Soviet Union.
The community of nations should take advantage of this cooperative
environment to create an international crimes tribunal by way of a Multilater-
al Convention. Such a Convention would provide the court with jurisdiction
to hear cases involving any of the offenses listed in the different Multilateral
Conventions.' 95 Moreover, the court would be competent to hear cases
against states, individuals, and all legal entities. The Convention would also
allow for limited reservations by states which ratify the convention. These
reservations would not significantly impair the effectiveness of the court.
The reservations would pertain only to those matters that are mandated by
domestic laws or constitutions (for example, a reservation that would call for
trial by jury if the constitution of a particular state guarantees that right to
its citizens).
Under this Convention, the court would have concurrent jurisdiction,
which would require that only the state in which the offense was committed
could grant the court consent to hear a case. Concurrent jurisdiction would
allow the state in which the crime was committed to retain the right to try
the case if for some reason the international tribunal is unable to conduct the
trial. This concurrent jurisdiction would also be subject to the condition that
double jeopardy will apply to secure the rights of the accused not to be
subjected to double prosecution for the same crime in either the international
or national court.
Furthermore, the Convention would provide that once consent to the
court's jurisdiction has been granted, it could not be unilaterally withdrawn.
This would follow the model of the International Center for Settlement of
with one Abstention).
193 See Another War Falls Out of Fashion, The Economist, Jan. 11, 1992, at 40.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 138-139.
'" For a partial list of the Conventions involved, see suprd notes 167-176.
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Investment Disputes (ICSID).96 Although the court would have jurisdic-
tion over offenses listed in the different Multilateral Conventions, the court's
subject-matter jurisdiction would be limited at its inception to no more than
two types of crimes-namely narcotics and terrorism-with the capacity for
expansion in the future.
Despite the elaborate work and time dedicated to drafting the above
proposals, international response has been, at best, non-committal as states
continue to either invent or recycle objections to the establishment of an
international criminal tribunal. Today, objections to the creation of an
international crimes court include claims that such a court would interrupt
the existing system or that the court might become politicized. Questions
range from whether states not currently cooperating in the prosecution of
international crimes will be more inclined to cooperate with an international
criminal court, to whether such an international court will infringe upon the
sovereignty of states.
However, these objections have been addressed by at least one of the
proposals above, and the ABA Task Force proposal answers both questions.
Similarly, more general questions persist which address such issues as court
composition, access to witnesses, appropriate punishment, and others.
In the end, most objections to the establishment of an international crimes
court are simply that - objections. Thus, they do not present serious questions
which must be addressed in order to cultivate consensus and move forward
with the creation of an international crimes court. Unfortunately, as we
leave the fabled Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain, ready.to carry his
charge and concluding "all is well,' 97 the family of nations cannot be so
content.
'" See generally D.W. Bowett, The Law or International Institutions 27 (4th ed. 1982).
19 CAMUS, supra note 2, at 123.
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